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An Examination of Two of New York State's
Brownfields Remediation Initiatives:
Title V of the 1996 Bond Act and the
Voluntary Remediation Program
GLEN M.VOGEL, P.E.*
[We stand] today poised on a pinnacle of wealth and power, yet
we live in a land of vanishing beauty, of increasing ugliness, of
shrinking open space and of an overall environment that is di-
minished daily by pollution and noise and blight. This, in brief,
is the quiet conservation crisis.'
Introduction
During the past two decades, there has been an exodus of in-
dustrial jobs from our nation's urban areas. This industrial mi-
gration has left many cities with abandoned or underutilized
manufacturing or commercial facilities. Many of these sites are
contaminated with hazardous substances, however, the risks
posed by these sites usually are not serious enough to warrant in-
clusion on the National Priorities List 2 or comparable state lists of
* Resident in the Garden City office of Nixon Peabody, L.L.P.; B.S. Civil Engi-
neering, 1990, Widener University; Professional Engineer's License, 1995, New York
State; J.D. with honors, 1999, St John's University School of Law. I would like to
thank my wife Stephanie, because, without her support, this article would not have
been possible. Thank you to Professor Andrew Simons of St John's University School
of Law for his editorial assistance and encouragement. This article is dedicated to my
two incredible little boys, Grant and Noah.
1. SIMPSON'S CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS (1988) (quoting Stewart L. Udall,
United States Secretary of the Interior (1988)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994). This is a list of highly contaminated sites. Being
listed as a Superfumd site can cause economic ruin to a property owner because it
requires anyone who purchases the site to subject themselves to the remediation pro-
cess under CERCLA. See e.g. Michael B. Gerrard and Deborah Goldberg, Interaction
of Toxic Tort and CERCLA Litigation, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1996, at 3 (noting that this
process includes remedial and feasibility studies, public hearings, formal record of
decision, extensive sampling and volumes of paperwork); see also Michael B. Gerrard,
The Benefits and Risks of Going it Alone, NAT. RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT,
Winter 1999, at 462 (stating that sites on the National Priorities List take on average
almost twenty years to clean-up).
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hazardous waste sites. 3
Nevertheless, the mere suspicion of contamination has ham-
pered redevelopment of many of these sites,4 which are known as
brownfields. The Environmental Protection Agency has defined
brownfields as, "abandoned, idled or underutilized industrial and
commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is compli-
cated by real or perceived environmental contamination."5 These
properties range from expansive unused rail yards and steel mills
that can occupy hundreds of acres, to the relatively small local dry
cleaning shops and corner gas stations. 6 Most of these industrial
properties have lain fallow because, in the past, owners and devel-
opers have been reluctant to go through the cumbersome, costly,
and complex clean-up regulations required by the federal Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act 7 (hereinafter "CERCLA") and its state counterparts.8
As a result of this multitude of federal and state environmen-
tal laws, an increasing number of these abandoned brownfields
are not being redeveloped. 9 Instead, developers are utilizing pris-
tine property, known as greenfields. 10 Furthermore, since these
3. See Proposals to Remove Barriers to Brownfields Redevelopment: Testimony
before the Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment, Commit-
tee on Environmental and Public Works, U.S. Senate, Mar. 4, 1997, GAO/T-RCED-97-
87, at 3 (statement by Peter F. Guerrero, Director, Environmental Protection Issues,
Resources, Community and Economic Development Division).
4. See id.
5. Bernard A. Weintraub, Towards Voluntary 'Brownfield' Development in New
York, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 22, 1995, at 1; see also, Randi Schillinger and Laurie S.
Jacobovitz, The Brownfield Problem: Federal and State Clean-Up Efforts -Part I, THE
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, July 1998, at 13.
6. See Andrew C. Revkin, For Urban Wastelands, Tomatoes and Other Life, N. Y.
TIMES, March 3, 1998, at Al. These sites are also often acquired by municipalities via
tax foreclosure. They are not classified as Superfund sites and thus because they typi-
cally do not pose an imminent threat to health or the environment they can remain
vacant for decades; see e.g. Schillinger and Jacobovitz, supra note 5, at 13.
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). "Superfund imposes rigorous, inflexible reme-
dial standards and complex and time consuming procedural hurdles to the conduct of
remediation without providing certainty about when remediation is completed."
Gaines Gwathmey III and William J. O'Brien, States Stimulate Brownfield Redevelop-
ment, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at $1.
8. See Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Site Act (IHWDSA), N.Y. ENVTL. CON-
SERV. LAW §§ 27-1301-1305 (McKinney Supp. 1997). (Includes a section requiring the
listing of the most hazardous sites in the state on a registry and granting the state the
authority to force those responsible for the listed sites to take remedial action). See id.
§ 27-1305.
9. See Much of Superfund Brownfields Money Going to Fund State Cleanup Ef-
forts, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, May 4, 1998.
10. See id.
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industrial and manufacturing enterprises have fled our cities, the
urban centers they once occupied have been left behind to suffer
the effects of lost jobs, decreased tax revenue for the local commu-
nities, a decayed environment, and diminution in the quality of
life.11
To address these concerns and encourage redevelopment of
these sites, federal, state, and local governments, as well as pri-
vate organizations, have recently begun implementing initiatives
to remove obstacles to brownfield redevelopment. 12 One such ini-
tiative is Title V of the New York State Clean Water/Clean Air
Bond Act of 1996 (hereinafter "Title V"). 13 Under Title V, the
State has allocated $200 million for "environmental restoration
projects," which are supposed to lead to the remediation of brown-
field sites.' 4 Title V makes grants available to municipalities to
reimburse up to seventy-five percent of their cost of cleaning up
brownfields, and provides full release to the municipalities and all
successors-in-interest from liability for any additional clean-up of
contamination resulting from releases into the soil or ground-
water that occurred prior to the remediation project.' 5 The theory
behind the enactment of Title V was that in creating state-funded
incentives to remediate municipally owned brownfields sites,
these properties would become productive again, leading to new
jobs and other benefits for the communities where they are
located.16
Title V is not New York's only attempt at a solution to
brownfields. Its companion remedial program is the State Volun-
11. See Charles E. Sullivan, Jr., The Department of Environmental Conservation's
VRP, 8 ENVTL. LAW IN N.Y. at 17; see also Eisen, infra note 36 at 894-895.
12. See Warren Buchannan and E. Lynn Grayson, Historical Overview of
Brownfields, in THE BROWNFIELDS BOOK 6 (Jenner & Block and Roy F. Weston eds.,
1997) (offering a nationwide overview of the brownfields issue from the perspective of
an environmental law firm from Chicago, IL, and an environmental engineering firm
from West Chester, PA).
13. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 56-0501-56-0511 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
14. David L. Markell, Legal Development: Some Overall Observations About the
1996 New York State Environmental Bond Act and a Closer Look at Title V and its
Approach to the "Brownfields"Dilemma, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1217, 1224-25 (1997); see also
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0101(7) (defines an environmental restoration project
as "a project to investigate or to remediate hazardous substances located on real prop-
erty held in title by a municipality." Id.)
15. See Jonathan S. Karmel, The Second Circuit Review: 1996-97 Term: Environ-
mental Law: Title V of New York's Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act Authorizes Risk
Assessment to Clean Up Brownfields, 63 BROOKLYN L. REV. 469, 470 (1997); see also
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 56-0503, 0509.
16. See Markell, supra note 14, at 1227.
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tary Clean-up Program (hereinafter "VCP"). 17 The VCP differs
significantly from Title V in the type of release from liability af-
forded participants, the availability of funding, which parties may
participate in the program, and what standards are to be used to
establish the clean-up levels.18 One other significant difference
between the programs is that, unlike Title V, the VCP is an ad-
ministrative creation not embodied in any statute or legislation.
Instead, the VCP is detailed in various forms of literature pub-
lished and disbursed by officials from the New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation.' 9
While both Title V and the VCP have made brownfields rede-
velopment more attractive, they are not without their issues and
questions. There are financial and environmental justice issues,
questions regarding each program's actual impact on the real es-
tate and job markets, debates over the standards used during the
approach to site remediation, and the question of who is eligible to
participate in each program. 20 However, in spite of their imper-
fections, these programs have begun to address the serious issue
of reclaiming contaminated properties, and have had some success
to date.21
"Brownfields remediation is one of today's hottest environ-
mental topics. '22 New legislation is constantly being proposed
and articles and notices for conferences and lectures appear in
various legal and environmental periodicals each day.23 Since
much has been said on the topic, this article will focus on only
certain areas and issues. Part I of this article will look at the his-
torical origins of brownfields, including CERCLA24 and its New
17. See Charles E. Sullivan, Jr., Voluntary Cleanup: The DEC's Solution, ALB. L.
ENVTL. OUTLOOK 30-31, Summer 1995.
18. See id.; compare N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 56-0501-0511.
19. See Michael B. Gerrard, 2 BROWNFIELDS LAw AND PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP
AND REDEVELOPMENT OF CONTAMINATED LAND § NY.01[1] (Matthew Bender ed., 1998).
20. See generally, Christopher J. Daggett, Brownfields: An Entrepreneur's Per-
spective, 9 ENVTL. LAW IN N.Y. 3, Mar. 1998, at 33; Matic, Shelley & Cooper, Chemical
Engineering, Oct. 1997 at 41.
21. See infra notes 122-160 and 219-265 (discussing projects successfully com-
pleted under Title V and the VCP).
22. Christopher J. Daggett, Brownfields: An Entrepreneur's Perspective, 9 ENVTL.
LAW IN N.Y. 33 (Mar. 1998); see, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 11; Sullivan, infra note 26;
see also Sullivan, infra note 37.
23. Christopher J. Daggett, Brownfields: An Entrepreneur's Perspective, 9 ENVTL.
LAw IN N.Y. 33 (Mar. 1998).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
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York State counterpart, 25 which some environmentalists claim
share a part of the responsibility for creating the disincentives to
remediate brownfields. Part II will examine Title V in greater de-
tail and will include an analysis of the Irvington Waterfront Park
Project, a remediation project that is utilizing Title V funds. Part
III will examine the VCP and how it compares and contrasts with
Title V, and will discuss two projects that have achieved a mea-
sure of success under the program: Weyman Avenue in New
Rochelle and a paper recycling facility in Staten Island. Finally,
Part IV will briefly focus on some of the issues and problems that
have not been addressed by these brownfield initiatives, including
a few of the more visible problems associated with the effect
brownfields have had on the issue of environmental justice. Part
V will conclude with a discussion on how some of these issues may
be resolved to increase the effectiveness of New York State's ap-
proach to brownfields remediation.
I. Brownfields: A Historical Perspective
Roughly two centuries of industrial development in America
have left their mark on current land use.26 A particularly vexing
issue facing environmentalists today is how to cope with the in-
creasing number of abandoned, and often contaminated, indus-
trial and commercial sites, known as brownfields.27 The primary
reason that countless acres of industrial property have been left to
blight our nation's cities is economics. 28 During the period of the
industrial revolution, manufacturing facilities were erected in
close proximity to railways, major roadways and waterways. 29
The residential areas that developed around these facilities were
filled with workers who most often walked or used public trans-
25. See Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Site Act (IHWDSA), N.Y. ENVTL. CON-
SERV. LAw §§ 27-1301 to 27-1305 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
26. See Thomas M. Parris, Browsing for Brownfields; Websites on Brownfields, 40
ENV'T 5 at 3 (1998) (lists electronic information sources available to those interested
in brownfields redevelopment); see also Charles E. Sullivan, Jr., The Department of
Environmental Conservation's Voluntary Clean up Program, Oct. 16, 1996, at 3.
27. See Thomas M. Parris, Browsing for Brownfields; Websites on Brownfields, 40
ENV'T 5, at 3 (1998) (lists electronic information sources available to those interested
in brownfields redevelopment).
28. See Warren Buchannan and E. Lynn Grayson, Historical Overview of
Brownfields, in THE BROWNFIELDS BOOK 1 (Jenner et al. eds., 1997) (details the
problems experienced by the states in the "rust-belt" of the northeast and mid-north
region).
29. See id.
1999]
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portation to get to work.30 By the 1950s, the burst of expansion
towards the suburbs, coupled with the construction of new high-
ways and more efficient modes of transportation, made these in-
ner city locations less residentially desirable for workers and less
accessible to the larger trucks which were not able to navigate the
narrow roads, low bridges, and weight capacity restrictions on cer-
tain thoroughfares. 31 Over time, it became cost prohibitive for an
owner or developer to try to upgrade existing infrastructure be-
cause the clean-up expense and potential liability associated with
a contaminated property often far exceeded the cost of starting
with a fresh slate in a more rural area.32 In addition, even though
there would be costs associated with building on farmland, wood-
lands, or other rural plots, these costs were at least measurable
and predictable, in contrast to the often unknown and potentially
unlimited expense of assuming liability for, and cleaning up, a
contaminated city lot.33 As a result, in those decades that fol-
lowed World War II, industries were forced to close inner city fa-
cilities that were deemed "inefficient, noncompetitive, and
financially marginal," and to construct new, more modern facili-
ties in suburban areas to compete with the growth of low-cost for-
eign manufacturing industries and shifting consumer markets.34
The fall-out from this suburban commercial and industrial
sprawl often resulted in costly local infrastructure construction,
increased emissions from the vehicles of commuters, and loss of
precious open space and habitat. 35 Simultaneously, our once vi-
brant cities deteriorated. 36 Loss of employment and decreased
commercial activity usually led to increased crime, and those fi-
30. See id.
31. See id. at 2-3.
32. See Buchannan and Grayson, supra note 12, at 1; see also Poindexter, infra
note 42, at 7.
33. See Revkin, supra note 6, at Al (discussing that many sites lay vacant be-
cause no developer is willing to gamble on the cost of cleaning them up).
34. Id. at Al. These older industrial sites are not conducive to modern manufac-
turing processes because they often have limited productive reuse, low ceiling heights,
cut-up floor space, restricted truck docking space and obsolete utility systems. See id.
Furthermore, they usually have higher taxes than suburban or rural areas, they often
have a perception of security problems, the relative cost of providing utility services
such as electricity, natural gas, water and sewer facilities is higher in the cities, and
the mass exodus of the skilled workforce along with the rising cost of employing that
workforce have contributed to the movement of industries away from our cities. See
id. at 2-3.
35. See Sullivan, supra note 11.
36. See Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams"?: Challenges and Limits of VCP
and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV., 883, 891-2 (1996).
[Vol. 17
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nancially able to escape fled to the suburbs, leaving the poor and
minorities behind to suffer devastating economic and social ef-
fects.3 7 Consequently, not only had the cities become blighted, but
now the suburbs were becoming the heirs to the cities' problems. 38
They were becoming more industrialized, which in turn, trans-
lated to more pollution, higher taxes, and crime. People thought
they would escape all those things if they moved to the suburbs,
but in actuality, the problem followed them.3 9
It is estimated that there are between 250,000 and 500,000
contaminated properties nationwide with a clean-up price tag that
could reach as high as $650 billion.40 Because cities have not
completed their individual inventories of brownfields, more exact
national statistics are not yet available. 41 In spite of the stagger-
ing numbers of contaminated properties, the cities have created
various brownfield remediation programs in an attempt "to pro-
vide an antidote to the bitter pill of deindustrialization by reusing
the existing, vacant infrastructure through 'reindustrialization.'
[It is believed that] [elconomic life can be pumped into a dying
neighborhood by lifting regulatory barriers that prevent produc-
tive use of abandoned property."42  Since the brownfield pro-
37. See Memorandum from Charles E. Sullivan, Jr., of the New York State De-
partment of Environmental Conservation, at 1 (May 21, 1996) (on file with the au-
thor) (explaining why the Department created the Voluntary Remedial Program).
38. See SIMPSON'S CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS 1988 (citing N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
1980, wherein Charles Haar discusses the problems associated with the shifting of
industrial and commercial sites from the inner cities to the suburbs).
39. See id.
40. See Russ Banham, Cooperation Helps Brownfields Bloom, J. COMMERCE, Feb.
13, 1996, at 6A; see also David Ensign, State Brownfields Initiatives Continue to
Bloom, SPECTRUM: THE J. STATE GOV'T, March 22, 1998, at 4; see also Judith Evans,
Cleaning Up the Nations 'Brownfields Critics Want Some Assurances Industrial Sites
Aren't Re-Polluted, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 25, 1995, at E01; see also Revkin,
supra note 6, at 1.
41. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BARRIERS TO BROWNFIELD
REDEVELOPMENT 92-125, at 2 (1996).
42. Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and Unequal: A Comment on the Urban
Development Aspect of Brownfields Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 9 (1996) (dis-
cussing the two goals of the Brownfields initiatives: creation of employment in eco-
nomically distressed areas and preservation of pristine land from development); see
also, John McGahren, P.E. and William S. Hatfield, Brownfields by the Book, CIVL
ENGINEERING, Nov. 1998, at 42 (discussing how brownfield laws are designed to bring
industry back into the vacant urban centers and to protect existing greenfields by
removing risk from developers). Approximately forty states, including New York,
have created Voluntary Cleanup Programs. Some of the features common to these
programs are: releases from liability, contribution protection, streamlined clean-up
procedures, risk based clean-up standards and financial assistance such as tax incen-
tives and loan programs. See id.
1999]
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grams focus on areas affected by deindustrialization, the urban
centers of the northeast are particularly well suited to receive
such attention. 43
The northeast's most urban state, New York, is reportedly
home to thousands of brownfield properties. 44 Considering that
New York State has been highly industrialized for over 100 years,
and is the nation's second most populous state, 45 undoubtedly
there are many more contaminated properties that have yet to be
discovered.
A. CERCLA's Role in Contributing to the Proliferation of
Brownfields
In reaction to the environmental damage caused by decades of
industrialization, when disposal of hazardous waste and contami-
nated substances was virtually uncontrolled, the federal and state
governments enacted some of the strictest environmental regula-
tions in the world.46 Those laws 47 provided our nation with
43. See Eisen, supra note 36, at n.24.
44. See Charles E. Sullivan, Jr., The Department of Environmental Conservation's
Voluntary Remedial Program, 8 ENVL. LAW IN N.Y., Feb. 1997, at 17 (explaining the
need for a Brownfield redevelopment program in New York State).
To provide a general quantitative sense of this, one should consider that
there are . . .873 inactive hazardous waste disposal sites listed in the
April 1996 New York State Registry of Inactive Hazardous Waste Dispo-
sal sites and 86 suspected inactive hazardous waste disposal sites under-
going or awaiting investigation. Typically, about fourty confirmed or
suspected sites are brought into the Department's inactive hazardous
waste site disposal tracking system annually. There are over 130 known
former manufactured gas plant sites across the State. Typically, about
6,200 petroleum underground storage tanks and 2,700 hazardous sub-
stance underground storage tanks are closed annually, and associated
virtually with each is a discharge incident; additionally, it is estimated
that over the next three years, about 30,000 petroleum underground stor-
age tanks at 10,000 separate facilities will have closed. The Department's
hazardous substances waste study noted the existence of at least 347 con-
taminated industrial sites and an additional 152 miscellaneous contami-
nated sites across the State.
Id.
45. See Michael B. Gerrard, New York State's Brownfields Programs: More and
Less Than Meets the Eye, 28 ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS, Aug. 1998, at 10444 (discussing
the various brownfield programs available in New York State).
46. See Kevin G. Ryan, New Initiatives in Brownfield Redevelopment, Part Two,
MUImcIPAL LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 1995, at 4.
47. See e.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (1994); Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1272 (1994), Clean
Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994), Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994), Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994), and CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
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cleaner air, drinking water, and navigable waterways, however,
these laws have also had some detrimental side effects. 48 The
proliferation of brownfields is precisely one of the detrimental re-
sults that could have been foreseen with the passage of CERCLA
and its New York State counterpart. 49 In fact, the existence of
brownfields is believed by some to be the child of broad reaching,
strict liability based environmental statutes such as CERCLA.50
Some of the elements of CERCLA that have impacted an owner or
developer's decision whether or not to buy, sell, or develop a
brownfield property include: the strict, joint, several and retroac-
tive liability for all owners or operators of sites that are contami-
nated;51 the monumental expense of litigating an action under
CERCLA;5 2 and the complex, far reaching clean-up levels that are
required. 53
It has become commonplace to pin the blame for unused
brownfields on the liability provisions of CERCLA because its
broad coverage has created a "phobia among many lenders or de-
velopers" 54 who otherwise might have pursued former industrial
properties for redevelopment.55 CERCLA imposes strict joint and
several liability for all owners or operators of sites where hazard-
ous substances have been disposed. 56 The liability for clean-up
costs is not imposed according to the harm done, but rather as a
48. See Ryan, supra note 46.
49. See Stephen L. Gordon and Bernard A. Weintraub, Brownfield Development
Around the Tri-State Area, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 15, 1996, at 52. (Referring to CERCLA and
the Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Site Act (IHWDSA)); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994), and N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-1301-1321 (McKinney
Supp. 1997).
50. See Lynne M. Miller and Douglas E. Gladstone, Why the Brownfield Redevel-
opment Market is Up, ENvTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIGATION STRATEGY, Nov. 1997, at 4;
see also Ryan, supra note 46.
51. See Charles D. Bader, Brownfield Remediation, REMEDIATION MANAGEMENT,
May/June 1996, at 9. "Strict liability means that a party does not have to be found
negligent to be found liable. Joint-and-several liability means that any single respon-
sible party can be made to pay for all the clean-up costs at a site, even if other parties
contributed to the contamination. Retroactive liability means that parties can be held
liable for contamination that occurred before the law was passed." Id.
52. See David G. Balmer, Why Build on Green When You Can Have Brown, OHIO
ENVTL. LETTER, Sept. 1997. A study conducted in 1991 "found that litigation costs for
potentially responsible parties involved in federal CERCLA cases ranged from
$60,000 to $90,000. . .", and this did not include the cost of the clean-up itself. Id.
53. See generally, id. (Reviewing the clean-up requirements under CERCLA); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 9621.
54. Lynne M. Miller and Douglas E. Gladstone, Why the Brownfield Redevelop-
ment Market is Up, ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIGATION STRATEGY, Nov. 1997, at 4.
55. See id.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
1999]
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result of the degree of connection to the property.5 7 Under CER-
CLA, "almost any party which has owned or operated the site
since its initial exposure to contamination, or transported waste to
the land, may be held liable for the full cost of cleaning up any
hazardous waste release associated with the site."58 The purpose
of such a liability structure is to spread the costs among the vari-
ous parties associated with the hazardous waste industry at a
minimal cost to the government.5 9 Consequently, purchasers and
developers who seek to acquire contaminated property frequently
subject themselves to the same liability that the present or past
57. See id.
58. Robert S. Berger, Recycling Industrial Sites in Erie County: Meeting the Chal-
lenge of Brownfield Redevelopment, 3 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 80 (1995) (discussing the
need for a comprehensive redevelopment strategy that goes beyond just voluntary
clean-up programs); 42 U.S.C. § 9607 states:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section;
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous sub-
stances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party
or entity, and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites
selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the occurrence of response costs, of a hazardous sub-
stance, shall be liable for,
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the na-
tional contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, in-
cluding for reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9404(I) of this title.
Id. The group of potentially responsible parties is specifically outlined in the statute,
and it has been more precisely defined by case law in the years since CERCLA's crea-
tion; see id. at n.17, (citing cases including; General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus.
Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1418 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
1390 (1991); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 n.ll (4th Cir. 1988);
New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Hooker Chems. and Plastics Corp., 680 F.Supp. 546 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Violet v. Picillo,
648 F.Supp. 1283, 1290 (D.R.I. 1986)).
59. See id. at 82.
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owner carries. 60 This has the unintended effect of discouraging
the acquisition and remediation of contaminated commercial and
industrial property.61
While the passage of the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act in 198862 (hereinafter "SARA") has provided
an innocent landowner exemption from liability for landowners
who purchase property after it is contaminated, it is important to
point out that the exemption applies only to owners who acquire
the property without knowledge of its contaminated status.63
Most lenders, with the threat of potential CERCLA liability loom-
ing, now require an environmental inspection of property prior to
its purchase.64 Thus, it is nearly impossible to purchase a contam-
inated industrial or commercial piece of property in New York
without having some knowledge of its contamination. This makes
it very difficult to use the innocent purchaser defense provided
under SARA. Ironically, even if a purchaser is "innocent," if it still
owns the property when the contamination is discovered, the pre-
vious "innocent" status affords little solace.
Once a property is deemed "contaminated," CERCLA's clean-
up standards often become one of the biggest stumbling blocks to
remediation. 65 The statute requires an "assessment of permanent
solutions and alternative treatment technologies... that, in whole
or in part, will result in a permanent and significant decrease in
the toxicity, mobility, or volume of the hazardous substance, pollu-
tant, or contaminant."66 Traditionally, this has meant restoring
60. See id. at 83.
61. See id. at 84.
62. 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-9626 (1994).
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(I) (1988) (stating that "at the time the defendant
acquired the facility the defendant did not know and had no reason to know that any
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was
disposed of on, in, or at the facility." Id.)
64. See Berger, supra note 58, at 85 (discussing the limited applicability of the
innocent landowner defense).
65. See Berger, supra note 58 at 91.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(b)(1) (1998). This section requires the President to take into
account: (1) the long term uncertainties associated with land disposal; (2) the goals,
objectives, and requirements of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1994); (3) the persis-
tence, toxicity, mobility, and propensity to bioaccumulate of such hazardous sub-
stances and their constituents; (4) short- and long-term potential for adverse health
effects from human exposure; (5) long-term maintenance costs; (6) the potential for
future remedial action costs if the alternative remedial action in question were to fail;
and (7) the potential threat to human health and the environment associated with
excavation, transportation, and redisposal, or containment. See id., §§ 9621(b)(1)(A)-
(G).
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the site to its pre-disposal condition, 67 but, since this language
leaves some room for interpretation, a responsible party can never
be entirely sure what level of clean-up will actually be required. 68
Therefore, as a result of the contamination, developers and own-
ers are hard pressed to predict what the clean-up costs will be or
when the process will in fact be complete. As a consequence, "a
return on [their] investment is uncertain in comparison with the
potential return on a project on a greenfield site."69
CERCLA is not the only environmental statute that has dis-
couraged a developer or owner from remediating contaminated
property. There are state equivalents to CERCLA that have also
had the incidental effect of discouraging parties from taking on a
remediation project.70
B. New York State's Superfund Statute Discourages
Brownfield Remediation
New York's inactive hazardous waste disposal legislation,
which differs significantly from CERCLA, is found in section 27-
1300 of the New York Environmental Conservation Law71 (herein-
after "ECL"). The applicability of the ECL is more narrow than
CERCLA because, whereas CERCLA applies to all hazardous sub-
stances (which includes hazardous waste), the ECL applies only to
hazardous wastes.72 Furthermore, the definition of "hazardous
waste" is different under the two statutes. New York's definition
includes certain substances specifically listed within the statute's
regulations, 73 as well as any waste that may cause or significantly
contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, incapacitating illnesses, or that poses a substantial
present or potential hazard to human health or the environ-
ment. 74 Even though the ECL's application to "hazardous wastes"
is a narrower field than CERCLA's "hazardous substances," it is
67. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 484.
68. See Berger, supra note 58, at 76-77 (discussing specific barriers to redevelop-
ing brownfields).
69. Berger, supra note 58 (discussing the many economic factors that must be
considered by developers when selecting a site to erect their business including the
deterrents caused by the liability imposed by CERCLA should they choose a contami-
nated site).
70. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-1301-1321 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
71. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1300 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
72. See Berger, supra note 58, at 90.
73. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 371.1 (1995).
74. See N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0901(3), 27-1301(1); see also N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 1389(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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nonetheless confusing, not easily defined, and leads to uneasiness
for owners or purchasers of contaminated property.7 5 That uneas-
iness is exacerbated by the fact that, much like its federal compan-
ion, the ECL does not specifically define who may be a responsible
party.7 6 In fact, conversely to CERCLA's case law definitions of
who may be a responsible party, the ECL leaves this determina-
tion to the discretion of the Commissioner of the Department of
Environmental Conservation (hereinafter "DEC").77 So far, the
DEC has set forth regulations that define responsible parties to
include the same cast of characters held responsible under CER-
CLA, but the Commissioner could add others at his or her
discretion. 78
Under the clean-up standards set forth in the guidance docu-
ments for interpreting the ECL, any remedial program under-
taken must restore the site to pre-disposal conditions, limited to
the extent feasible and authorized by law. 79 "[R]egulators have
traditionally begun with the presumption that concentration
levels of contaminants must be low enough for small children to
ingest small quantities of soil with hardly any increased risk of
cancer or other health problems."80 Unlike the voluntary clean-up
program discussed later in this article, the ECL regulations state
that even if requiring clean-up to meet pre-disposal conditions is
not feasible, the least preferable way of eliminating risks to
human health is by restricting the future use of the property
through engineering controls or deed restrictions.8 ' Thus, it ap-
pears that the state clean-up standards follow the same path as,
and are based largely on, the federal standards.8 2 The standards
and procedures under the ECL particularly mirror the federal
standards in that they also require the use of threshold, modify-
ing, and balancing criteria when evaluating a clean-up plan.8 3
75. See Gerrard, supra note 19, at § NY.02[1].
76. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1313(4).
77. See id.
78. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 375-1.3(u) (1995).
79. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 484 (remarking that the statute allows the use
of engineering or institutional controls but prefers clean-up to pre-disposal condi-
tions); see also 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 375-1.10(b) (1995).
80. Karmel, supra note 15, at 484. "New York also assumes 'an intake rate of 0.2
gram/day for a five year exposure period for a 16-kg child.'"Id at 475 n.29 (citing
NYDEC, TAGM: DETERMINATION OF SOIL CLEANUP OBJECTIVES AND CLEANUP LEVELS
(1994)).
81. See id. at 484.
82. See id.
83. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(I) (1996).
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"The threshold criteria indicate the acceptable level of risk to
human health which may exist after clean-up takes place, [and
requires that the clean-up must] eliminate, reduce, or control
risks to human health and the environment."8 4 To satisfy these
criteria, the clean-up must prevent human exposure to the con-
taminants.85 The modifying criteria require that any proposed
clean-up program must take into consideration the community's
reasonable concerns, particularly the concerns of the residents
who live or work near the property.8 6 The third step, the balanc-
ing criteria, requires the parties involved to look at the long-term
effectiveness and permanence of the clean-up; the reduction of tox-
icity, mobility, or volume through the proposed treatment; the
plan's short-term effectiveness; its implementability; and the cost
effectiveness of the remediation.8 7 This, in essence, requires the
balancing of the "risks and costs of removal and treatment with
the risks and costs of a solution which prevents human exposure
while leaving some or all of the contamination on site."88 As men-
tioned in the discussion of CERCLA, in spite of the state and fed-
eral statutes' apparent flexibility toward clean-up levels, in the
past the DEC has most often required the site to be returned to
pre-contamination condition.8 9
Two important distinctions between the federal and state ap-
proaches must be noted. First, unlike SARA, the ECL provides no
protection for innocent landowners who have become responsible
parties solely because of their ownership interest. 90 Second, the
ECL does not provide an exemption from liability for mere lenders
or fiduciaries. 91 The New York State Superfund program, like the
federal program, includes far reaching liability and rigorous
clean-up standards.92 Thus, the broad liability regimes associ-
ated with CERCLA and the ECL make taking responsibility for a
contaminated parcel, even to remediate it, risky business. 93
84. Karmel, supra note 15, at 474-75 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.430(e)(9)(iii)(A)-(B),
300.430(a)(1)).
85. See id. at 476.
86. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(i)(c)).
87. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(I)(B).
88. Karmel, supra note 15, at 477.
89. See Eisen, supra note 36, at 909-910.
90. See Gerrard, supra note 19, at § NY.02[3].
91. See id. at § NY.02[4].
92. See Weintraub, supra note 5, at 7.
93. See Weintraub, supra note 5, at 1 (citing under-funding, under-staffing, com-
plex procedures and slow pace of administration as the reasons why the existing state
statutes play a limited role in remediating contaminated sites throughout the state).
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Having traced the birth and proliferation of brownfields
through the onset of federal and state statutes that have had the
incidental effect of contributing to the failure to reclaim these con-
taminated sites, it is time to look at what New York State has
done in the last five years to turn the tide and encourage industry
to reuse and redevelopment of these properties. 94
II. Title V of the New York State Environmental Bond Act
of 1996
The 1996 Bond Act, specifically Title V, represents one of New
York State's responses to the growing problem of brownfields. Ti-
tle V allows the state to borrow up to $200 million to fund environ-
mental restoration projects. 95 This substantial sum is the largest
brownfields grant program in the country and should be sufficient
to fund vast numbers of clean-ups.96 Under Title V, eligibility is
limited to municipalities 97 who can be reimbursed for as much as
seventy-five percent of the clean-up costs they incur on a remedia-
tion project. 98 The funding is limited to "environmental restora-
tion projects" which the 1996 Bond Act defines as "projects to
investigate or to remediate hazardous substances located on real
property held in title by a municipality. '" 99 Title V also requires
that, as part of the tradeoff for receiving state funds, municipali-
94. See generally Berger, supra note 58 (pointing out that New York's high clean-
up standards and unyielding liability provisions have contributed to the growing
brownfields problem); see also Karmel, supra note 15 (discussing the proliferation of
brownfields resulting from strict interpretations of clean-up standards); see also Mar-
kell, supra note 14 (remarking that a concerted effort is needed to remediate aban-
doned or underutilized industrial sites).
95. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10444 (examining the status of the voluntary
remediation program and how it comports with other programs designed to specifi-
cally address the brownfields dilemma); see also U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Region 2, New York Bond Act Funds Municipal Brownfields, BROWNFIELDS Q.
COMMUNITY REP., Spring 1997, at 1. (summarizing the features of Title V as part of
the Agency's newsletter on brownfields) and Dale English, For Sale or Lease: Region
Struggles to Find Ways to Use Brownfields; Buffalo, New York, BUSINESS FIRST OF
BUFFALO, June 30, 1997, at 23 (discussing the City of Buffalo and the extensive prob-
lem they face in trying to remediate the vast number of abandoned contaminated
properties).
96. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10444.
97. See Kevin G. Ryan, Update On Implementation of the Clean Water / Clean Air
Bond Act of 1996, THE N.Y. ENVTL. LAWYER, Fall 1997, at 6 n.8 (publishing the first in
a series of updates by the New York State Bar Association that will examine the Bond
Act program as it develops).
98. See Gerrard, supra note 19, at § NY.08[1].
99. Markell, supra note 14, at 1229 n.58; see also Gerrard, supra note 19, at
§ NY.08[1](a) (discussing that eligibility for the program is limited to municipalities
that are not responsible for the contamination).
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ties make "all reasonable efforts" to recover the funds expended by
the state from any responsible parties. 10 0 This requirement was
included to prevent private owners from escaping liability by
transferring property to a municipality to take advantage of Title
V's funding.' 0 '
When considering whether to accept a project and to allocate
Title V funds, the DEC uses four criteria listed in the statute for
prioritizing and selecting from eligible projects.' 0 2 These criteria
are: (1) the environmental benefit if the project is remediated ex-
peditiously; (2) the economic benefit to the state; (3) the site's po-
tential use for public recreation; and (4) the opportunity to fund
the remediation project through other means, such as
Superfund. 10 3 Environmental projects for which other funding
sources are not available will be given the highest priority. 04
One of the most attractive benefits of Title V is that it pro-
vides liability protection for the municipality, any successors in
title, and lessees and lenders. 10 5 The statute states that the par-
ties "shall not be liable to the state upon any statutory or common
law cause of action, or to any person upon any statutory cause of
action arising out of the presence of any hazardous substance in or
on the property at any time before the effective date of [the con-
tract executed by the municipality and the DEC.]" 06 There are
some conditions that apply to the release, such as the party cannot
have been a responsible party, the release does not apply to future
contamination, and the release can be revoked if it is discovered
that the conditions at the site are not sufficiently protective of
human health for its current use. 10 7 Along with the release from
liability, "perhaps the most remarkable provision of Title V... is
the section committing the state to indemnify these four catego-
100. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0507(2) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
101. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10444.
102. See Markell, supra note 14, at 1230.
103. See N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. Law §§ 56-0505(1)(a)-(d); see also Markell, supra
note 14, at 1230-31; see also David J. Freeman and Gregory R. Belicamino, Funding
Procedures for Brownfields: Bond Act Offers an Opportunity for Revitalization,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30, 1997, at S3.
104. See N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0505(1)(d); see also Markell, supra note
14, at 1231.
105. See Kevin G. Ryan, New Incentives in Brownfield Redevelopment, 9 MUNICIPAL
LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 1995, at 3.
106. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0509(1)(a)(i).
107. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0509(2).
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ries of parties against the amount of any judgment or settlement
resulting from common-law tort actions."1 08
While much of what has been mentioned so far seems attrac-
tive to parties interested in redeveloping brownfields, there are
several potential drawbacks to Title V that need to be mentioned.
First, Title V requires that environmental restoration projects be
cleaned up according to state Superfund standards. 10 9 These
standards require the elimination of significant threats to human
health or the environment.110 This most often means that the site
must be returned to pre-contamination condition, or that the con-
centrations will be low enough for residential use.1 1" ' These are
extremely extensive and expensive clean-up standards and this
requirement often turns away parties who may have been inter-
ested in reusing a contaminated property for industrial pur-
poses. 11 2 To address this concern, the DEC has recently shown
some flexibility in evaluating clean-up plans. 11 3
The second issue that creates some problems is that Title V
eligibility is limited to sites owned by municipalities." 4 The un-
fortunate result of this limitation is that many contaminated
properties, which would otherwise meet the requirements of the
statute, will remain unremediated because they are not munici-
pally owned. 115 This may also result in private owners transfer-
ring their properties to municipalities to make them eligible for
the funding, which in turn places an additional burden on taxpay-
ers. 1 6 Finally, some municipalities themselves are passing on the
opportunity to remediate sites under Title V because they feel it is
"not worth applying for such restrictive aid"1 7 and because of the
strict clean-up standards, a project would be too costly and could
take years to complete." 8
In spite of these concerns, some communities are taking ad-
vantage of the Title V program. As of November 1998, the DEC
108. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 56-0509(3); see also Ryan, supra note 105, at 4.
109. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0505(3).
110. See id. at § 27-1313(3).
111. See Markell, supra note 14, at 1237.
112. See Eisen, supra note 36, at 906-909.
113. See generally, Record of Decision, infra note 123. (The NY State DEC permit-
ted contaminated soil to remain on the site and chose to cap the soil instead of requir-
ing complete removal which would have been more costly.)
114. See Markell, supra note 14, at 1234.
115. See id. at 1234.
116. See id.
117. Revkin, supra note 6, at Al.
118. See id.
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reportedly allocated approximately $14.7 million for eighty-eight
investigation or remediation projects throughout the State. 119 Of
these eighty-eight Title V funded projects, eighty-three grants
were for site investigation and the remaining five were for actual
remediation. 120 The reason for the lopsided division of funds be-
tween investigation grants and remediation grants is because in
the first year after Title V's enactment, the DEC only accepted
applications for site investigations while they worked on develop-
ing formal rules and regulations to be used in evaluating and
overseeing remediation projects. 121 By 1998, however, the agency
was ready to start accepting applications and awarding grants for
site remediations. One such remediation grant was for the
remediation of the Irvington Waterfront Park.
A. Title V's First Success Story: The Revitalization of the
Irvington Village Waterfront Park
In March 1998, the DEC approved $2.9 million in funding to
the Hudson River Village of Irvington (hereinafter "the Village")
to transform two former industrial sites into a public park. 22 The
Village has undertaken a project to remediate approximately 12.1
acres of waterfront property that, because of its contamination,
was found to pose a current or potential threat to public health
and the environment. 23 The site is situated on land that was cre-
ated from 1890 through 1940 by using fill material consisting gen-
erally of demolition debris, ash, and furnace slag.124 Until 1980,
the property was used primarily as a storage and distribution site
for lumber.' 25 Since 1980, the property was split and a portion
continued to be used as a lumber yard, while the other portion was
119. See Memorandum from New York State Department of Environmental Con-
servation to Malcolm Pirnie, Environmental Engineers & Scientists 1 (Nov. 4, 1998)
(on file with the author).
120. See id.
121. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 2, New York Bond Act Funds
Municipal Brownfields, BROWNFIELDS Q. COMMUNITY REP. Spring 1997, at 1 (summa-
rizing the features of Title V as part of the Agency's newsletter on brownfields).
122. See Revkin, supra note 6, at Al; see also Alex Philippidis, WESTCHESTER
CouNTY Bus. J., Mar. 23, 1998, at 1 (remarking that many of the communities along
Westchester County's forty-nine miles of Hudson River shore are developing or imple-
menting plans to revitalize their waterfront properties).
123. See generally Record of Decision, Irvington Waterfront Park Environmental
Restoration Project, Village of Irvington, Westchester County, Site Number B-00004-
3, Department of Environmental Conservation 1 (Mar. 1998).
124. See id. at 1.
125. See Philippidis, supra note 122, at 1.
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utilized for bus maintenance, furniture refinishing, and stage set
storage. 126
The Irvington property is unique in that it was jointly owned
by the Village and a private corporation, Scenic Hudson Trust.127
This joint municipal/private ownership status provided an oppor-
tunity to take advantage of the funds available under Title V as
well as the benefits of the State's Voluntary Cleanup Program. 128
The voluntary clean-up portion of the project will be discussed in
Part III of this article. In 1997, the Village entered into a contract
with the DEC to investigate the entire site and to develop a
remediation proposal. 129 The site investigation consisted of soil,
groundwater, and sediment sampling, and it revealed the pres-
ence of inorganics (metals, including lead) and semi-volatile or-
ganic compounds that are commonly associated with "coal tars,
ash, heavy petroleum oils and products of incomplete
combustion." 130
The investigation also provided that the possibility existed for
human exposure to these contaminants through ingestion of con-
taminated soil, inhalation of contaminated dust, and ingestion of
contaminated sediment. 13 1 It was further revealed that while the
site was not presently causing contamination of the adjacent Hud-
son River, the deteriorating bulkhead and flow of the water table
posed the potential threat of future release of contaminants into
the river. 132 With this information in hand, the Village and Scenic
Hudson Trust needed to develop feasible, cost effective remedial
goals that would protect human health and the environment.
Since the proposed future use of the Irvington Waterfront Park is
as a public park, the goals of the remediation are:
1. to eliminate the potential for direct human or animal
contact with contaminated soils and fill at the site;
2. reduce, control, or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the
contamination present within the soils and fill at the site;
3. eliminate the threat of surface waters by preventing sur-
face run-off from the contaminated soils and fill at the site;
126. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 1.
127. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 1.
128. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 1.
129. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 1.
130. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 4.
131. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 7-8.
132. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 8.
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4. eliminate the threat to sediments by preventing the sur-
face and subsurface discharge of contaminated fill material into
the Hudson River;
5. prevent, to the extent possible, the migration of contami-
nants in the fill to groundwater; [and]
6. provide for attainment of SCGs [Standards, Criteria, and
Guidance values] for groundwater quality at the limits of the
site, to the extent practicable. 133
The DEC evaluated the Village's application for Title V fund-
ing, including the site investigation and several proposed reme-
dial plans, and in March 1998, they issued their Record of
Decision outlining the necessary environmental remediation steps
required to provide safe public access and use of the Waterfront
Park. 3 4 The DEC approved the Village's plan to install a thirty-
inch soil cover to prevent direct contact with, and infiltration
through, the contaminated fill. 135 The soil cover would consist of
twelve inches of low permeability soil to "seal off" the contami-
nated fill, followed by a twelve-inch drainage layer and 6 inches of
topsoil.136 It is estimated that 41,800 cubic yards of soil would be
required to create this sloped cover, which would be designed to
direct seventy percent of precipitation away from the contami-
nated subsurface. 137 This remedial measure obviously does not
restore the site to its "pre-release condition," as is often the inter-
pretation of the clean-up requirements under Title V.1 38 The plan
does, however, eliminate significant threats to human health and
the environment, which is the actual requirement; and this is
where the DEC showed their ability to be flexible by depending on
a plan's feasibility when considered with its alternatives.
Using the three "criteria" required by the ECL, and referred
to in Title V, 139 the engineers on the project developed a remedia-
tion plan that would not require the removal of the tens of
thousands of yards of contaminated fill.14° First, under the
threshold criteria, it was determined that the soil cap would pro-
vide "sufficient containment that no migration of contaminated fill
133. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 9.
134. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 9.
135. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 15.
136. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 10.
137. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 10.
138. See Karmel, supra note 80 and accompanying text.
139. See 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 375-1.10(c) (1995) (referring to 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(1)(I)
(1996)).
140. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 15-17.
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would occur . .. "141 This would virtually eliminate the risk of
human exposure to the contaminants. Second, the modifying cri-
teria was satisfied by the plan to cap the site in lieu of the alterna-
tive to remove the soil which would have resulted in a tremendous
volume of truck traffic rumbling through the community carrying
contaminated payloads. 142 The community was generally opposed
to solutions that required the transporting of removed contami-
nants through their streets which the approved remedial plan
would not require. 143 Third, the various elements of the balancing
criteria were satisfied by the determination that the soil cap
would result in: 1) little short- or long-term exposure to the con-
taminated fill by humans or the environment; 2) long-term man-
agement at a non-prohibitive cost; 3) a reduction in the mobility of
the contaminants; and 4) an implementation that would be no
more time consuming or difficult to complete than the other sug-
gested solutions. 14
In addition to the soil cover, the DEC approved a bulkhead
rehabilitation plan that would provide structural support for the
cover fill and would help prevent the release of contaminated fill
particles into the Hudson River.1 45 Since the approved remedy
would result in untreated hazardous substances remaining at the
site, the DEC also required that a long-term groundwater and
sediment monitoring system be instituted.' 46 Finally, under this
Record of Decision, the DEC provided the Village and Scenic Hud-
son Trust with liability releases after it determined that they were
not responsible parties under the definition of Title V.' 47
The rehabilitation of the Irvington Waterfront Park is the
first remediation project in the State that has begun construction
utilizing Title V grant funds. 48 There are presently four other
remedial grants totaling approximately $5 million that have not
yet begun the construction phase, which are earmarked for the
cities of Syracuse, East Rome, Rochester, and Buffalo.1 49 It was
estimated that, when complete, the total cost to implement the
remedial measures at Irvington Park, which includes the annual
141. Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 15-17.
142. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 15-17.
143. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 15.
144. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 13-15.
145. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 16.
146. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 16.
147. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 8.
148. See Memorandum, supra note 119, at 1.
149. See Memorandum, supra note 119, at 1.
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operating costs for the monitoring system for the next thirty
years, will be $3,834,450.150
B. The Next Title V Project on the Horizon: The South Buffalo
Redevelopment Project
The Title V remedial grant recently awarded to the City of
Buffalo is expected to be used as part of a master plan to redevelop
approximately 1,200 acres of brownfields properties in downtown
Buffalo, the Union Ship Canal area, historic sections of the City,
and many former industrial facilities. 151 The present goal of the
plan is to attract light industry, preserve open space, develop wa-
terfront parks and recreation, and enhance habitat. 152 This un-
dertaking is still in the planning process but it is estimated to
require a public investment of approximately $75 to $100 million
over a ten to twenty year period. 153 At one time, Buffalo was a
crossroads of transportation and a center of industrial growth and
trade.154 Much like the rest of the northeast region, "changing
times and market forces have caused heavy industry to de-
cline,"1 55 leaving vacant properties with challenging environmen-
tal conditions. 56 With the help of Title V, Buffalo hopes to turn
this decline around over the next decade.' 57
Title V of the 1996 Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act offers
municipalities an "excellent opportunity to revitalize individual
properties or entire [industrial complexes covering hundreds oil
acres, that lie dormant or underutilized because of actual or po-
tential environmental contamination."15 8 The DEC has tried to
make the application process fairly simple, however, it is impor-
tant to remember that once the application is accepted, the re-
quirements of the next steps in the process can be complex. 159
However, as demonstrated by the success of the Village of Irving-
ton, and the anticipted success of the City of Buffalo, municipali-
150. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 16.
151. See generally City of Buffalo, Division of Planning, South Buffalo Redevelop-
ment Plan, Project Summary, Feb. 1997 (on file with the author).
152. See id. at 1.
153. See id. at 3.
154. See id. at 1.
155. Id. at 1.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 3
158. David J. Freeman and Gregory R. Belicamino, Funding Procedures for
Brownfields; Bond Act Offers An Opportunity for Revitalization, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 30,
1997, at S3.
159. See id.
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ties may still find it advantageous to participate in this state
initiative.
III. New York State's Voluntary Cleanup Program
Title V funding can be a very effective tool for a municipality
to reclaim properties lost to environmental contamination. 160 But
what do you do if you are a private owner or developer who wishes
to remediate or purchase a brownfield site? Title V funding is not
available to private owners. 161 New York State answered that
question a few years before Title V was even enacted. 162 Initiated
in October 1994, the New York State DEC's Voluntary Cleanup
Program (hereinafter "VCP") allows a "volunteer"163 to enter into
an agreement with the DEC to clean up a brownfield site.164 The
VCP is neither statute based nor is it supported by formalized
agency regulations. 65 The DEC operates the program "based on
its authority to oversee remediation of environmental contamina-
tion,"1 66 and the guidelines for participation have been set forth in
several articles published by the Agency. 67 This program was
created with the intent of encouraging the "return of contami-
nated parcels to productive use, thereby getting those sites cle-
aned up with private dollars, and obviating the need to develop
uncontaminated lands when there exist well situated, but contam-
inated parcels."1 68
160. See Markell, supra note 14, at 1223.
161. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 56-0101(7); see also Ryan, supra note 97, at
6.
162. In late 1994 the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation
launched its Voluntary Remedial Program. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 25.
163. Volunteers can include site owners, operators, tenants, prospective purchas-
ers, lenders, municipalities and innocent purchasers. This is provided that none of the
above are deemed a potentially responsible party except by reason of ownership. See
Alan J. Wax, Commercial Real Estate/New Life For Abandoned Properties, NEWSDAY,
Apr. 7, 1997, at C13; see also Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle, NEW YORK ENVTL.
LAW HANDBOOK 336 (Government Institutes, Inc., 4th ed.) (1998).
164. See Todd S. Davis and Kevin D. Margolis, BROWNFIELDS, A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE To REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 532 (1997) (breaking down the
voluntary clean-up programs offered on a state-by-state basis).
165. See id. at 532.
166. Weintraub, supra note 5, at 1 (detailing the elements that make up the New
York State VCP, along with some proposed legislation to formally codify the
program).
167. See Sullivan, supra note 11; see also Sullivan, supra note 17, and Sullivan,
supra note 44.
168. Sullivan, supra note 11, at 25.
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One of the VCP's most attractive features is that eligibility to
participate in the program is much broader than that of Title V.169
Eligible parties "may include private and public parties, site own-
ers and operators, potentially responsible parties (hereinafter
"PRPs"), prospective purchasers, lenders, and others."170 The pro-
gram however, does not permit parties that are responsible for the
contamination to participate if the site is listed as a Class 1 or 2
Registry site, 71 or if the site is already subject to an environmen-
tal enforcement action by the state or federal government. 72 Per-
haps the DEC was concerned that allowing a potentially
responsible party to participate and gain a release from future lia-
bility, would preclude the state from seeking cost recovery from
that same party. 73 The drawback to this approach is that these
parties are the owners of many of the contaminated properties
within the state. Since these properties are often not contami-
nated enough to fall under CERCLA's jurisdiction, and their own-
ers are excluded from the VCP, the unfortunate result will be that
these properties will probably go unremediated. 174
To participate in the program, the volunteer must either
enter into a consent order or a legally enforceable agreement with
the DEC.' 75 The agreement must contain the method and techni-
cal standards of the clean-up, as well as the final clean-up level
the remediation must meet. 76 There are economic issues, such as
tax deductibility, and whether or not the volunteer can seek con-
169. See id. at 25; compare Gerrard, supra note 19, at § NY.08[1][2].
170. Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10445; see also Sullivan, supra note 44, at 25, and
Rigano, supra note 288, at 1; see also Davis & Margolis, supra note 164, at 533.
171. See Gerrard, supra note 19, § NY.05[1] [a].
The DEC compiles a registry of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites known as the
State Superfund list. Each site on the list is placed within one of six categories. The
categories are:
Class (1) sites are when immediate attention is required (no site has ever
been so classified);
Class (2) sites are when action is required;
Class (2a) sites where insufficient data exists to determine if action is
required;
Class (3) sites where action may be deferred;
Class (4) sites are closed but require continued management and;
Class (5) sites are closed and no further action is required.
Id.
172. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 25.
173. See Weintraub, supra note 5, at 1.
174. See Weintraub, supra note 5, at 1.
175. See Gerard, supra note 19, at § NY.01[2][b]-[c].
176. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10445; see also Weintraub, supra note 3, at 1
(discussing the first step in the remediation process under the VCP).
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tribution from others, that are associated with choosing either a
consent order or an agreement that will not be explored in greater
detail here other than to say there are advantages and disadvan-
tages to both approaches. 177 Once a volunteer chooses to proceed
via the order or agreement, the volunteer will be committed to an
initial site investigation, at the end of which they can either walk
away with no further obligation, or if they wish they may enter
into a commitment to complete the full remediation. 178 If the vol-
unteer chooses to commit to the remediation of the site, the nature
of the clean-up required will depend, in part, on the volunteer's
relationship to the contamination on site.179 One distinctive dif-
ference between the VCP and Title V is that under the VCP, not
only is the volunteer responsible for all clean-up costs himself, he
also has the obligation of reimbursing the DEC for the costs of the
Agency's oversight,180 whereas under Title V, the government
makes funds available to its participants to cover up to 75% of the
clean-up costs.181
Another difference between the two programs is that under
the VCP, a qualified release is normally executed by the DEC as
part of the consent order or agreement and takes effect after the
site is remediated.18 2 Under this agreement, the DEC states that
it does not intend further action against the party for the contami-
nation at the site with the proviso that this release is subject to
certain reopeners.18 3 These reopeners include changes in the
site's use that will require an additional clean-up; unknown condi-
tions at the time of the remediation are discovered and require
further remedial work; a fraudulently induced agreement; and the
discovery that the original response is not sufficient for the site's
intended use.'84 The difference here is that the qualified release
given under the VCP binds only the DEC and thus leaves the vol-
unteer open to enforcement or litigation from private parties, the
177. For a more detailed discussion of the economic, insurance and contribution
issues associated with consent orders or agreements, see Sullivan, supra note 11, at
25-26.
178. See id. at 26.
179. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10445. "A volunteer who is not a PRP (or who is
a PRP only because of site ownership) need not address off-site contamination, while
other volunteers must address such contamination." Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10445.
180. See Davis & Margolis, supra note 164, at 532-33.
181. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 470.
182. See Rigano, infra note 288, at 1.
183. See Gerrard, supra note 19, § NY.01[4].
184. See Memorandum, supra note 119, at 7.
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EPA, or the state attorney general.185 Although there are no for-
mal agreements not to do so, to date, neither the attorney general
nor the EPA has instituted enforcement actions against any sites
that have received protection under the VCP.186 Generally the
EPA does not anticipate taking action against a participant in an
approved state VCP unless it determines that there "may be an
imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health,
welfare, or the environment."18 7 This is quite different from the
release provided under Title V, wherein the DEC actually agrees
to indemnify the participant, lenders and future owners against
any common-law tort actions.188
Typically, a private party cleaning up a contaminated site
does so as an investment because they intend to develop it or sell
it to a developer.18 9 While the DEC fully expects that economic
development will be the main purpose behind an overwhelming
majority of the clean-ups under the VCP, an economic objective
need not exist.1 90 Nonetheless, when a volunteer has a specific
use in mind that will require state and/or local agency approval(s),
the VCP work plan would be subject to a SEQRA 9 review to de-
185. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 26-27.
186. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10445.
187. Memorandum from Elliott P. Laws and Steven A. Herman, New York State
DEC, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, and the Office of Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance, respectively, to the Superfund National Policy Members
at 2 (Nov. 14, 1996) (on file with the author). The Regions will review the State VCPs
to determine if they meet the following criteria:
1. The program provides the community with opportunities for meaning-
ful involvement;
2. The program ensures that response actions are protective of human
health and the environment;
3. The program has the sufficient resources to ensure timely and appro-
priate completion of actions, and that the agencies supporting the pro-
gram have technical abilities and streamlined procedures;
4. The program provides written approval of plans and a certification
upon their completion;
5. The agency has sufficient oversight to ensure the plan is conducted in
such a manner as to protect human health and the environment;
6. That the agency has the enforcement authority to ensure completion of
the response plan if the volunteer(s) fail or refuse to complete the plan.
Id. at 2.
188. See Kevin G. Ryan, The Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996, MUNiCIPAL
LAWYER, Nov.fDec. 1996, at 3.
189. See Julie Bailey, Brownfields and Legal Liability, PLANT SITES AND PARKS,
April 1998, at 20.
190. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 27.
191. See State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV.
LAW §§ 3-0301, 8-0113; see also 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.
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cide whether or not to proceed with the clean-up. 192 This could
result in a volunteer being required to complete an environmental
impact statement prior to the start of any remediation. 193
One of the most attractive elements of the VCP is that, in con-
trast to Title V, the VCP considers the likely uses of the property
when determining clean-up standards. 194 This difference makes
the VCP more flexible than Title V by allowing the use of institu-
tional and engineering controls, deed restrictions, and risk-based
evaluations when planning clean-up levels. 195 Under the VCP,
current owners or prospective purchasers of property can offer to
clean up a site to a safe level according to the site's intended fu-
ture use.196 Thus, if the volunteer proposes to clean-up to a level
less than what would be adequate for residential use, then, as
part of the DEC's acceptance of that plan, deed restrictions which
will bind all future owners will be placed on the property. 197
Since the level and the type of contamination at each site and
each volunteer's intended post-remediation use differs, the DEC
has been willing to demonstrate case-by-case flexibility when set-
ting clean-up levels, provided that institutional controls such as
deed restrictions are attached to the agreement and the property
to prevent future incompatible uses.' 98 Since this approach to
evaluating clean-up levels based on future land use and the
"risks" associated with the remedial measures are vastly different
from what has been done when formulating clean-up plans under
CERCLA and New York State's Superfund statute, this approach
deserves a closer look.
A. The New York State VCP Authorizes the Use of Risk-Based
Analysis and Institutional Controls
Risk assessment is the process of comparing the value of mul-
tiple clean-up options intended to reduce the risks to human
health, with the actual costs of each program to come up with a
ratio of risks eliminated per dollar spent for each option.199 The
192. See Sullivan, supra note 11, at 27.
193. See Rigano, infra note 289, at 1. Doing an environmental impact statement is
very often a time-consuming task. See id.
194. Compare Davis and Margolis, supra note 165, at 535 with Gerrard, supra note
19 at § NY.08[1].
195. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10447.
196. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 481.
197. See generally Edwards and North, infra note 213.
198. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10447; see also Karmel, supra note 15, at 481.
199. See Karmel, supra note 15, at 482.
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VCP allows the use of risk analysis when determining the most
effective clean-up plan for a particular site.200
The days of the ultra-expensive environmental clean-ups
aimed at purifying a site are past.201 Many brownfields deals will
be economically unattractive unless some of the costs are mini-
mized because the cost of remediating a brownfield is generally
higher than the cost of starting anew on a greenfield. 20 2 These
costs can often be reduced by utilizing risk-based corrective plans
that allow for some contamination to remain at the site by being
either "capped over" or enclosed. 203 A number of states, including
New York, have implemented risk-based remedial standards as
part of their voluntary clean-up programs. 20 4 These programs al-
low for less rigorous standards when the property is not to be used
for residential purposes, which results in reduced development
costs. 20 5 "If a contaminated piece of property was historically a
factory, it doesn't make much sense to clean it up to the standards
of a pristine children's playground."20 6
As technology advances, and technologies once thought of as
experimental become commonplace in clean-up programs, profes-
sionals are no longer limited in how they can approach the
200. As an example, suppose there are two clean-up plans to choose from - A and
B. According to the scientific evidence presented, choice B will save 100 more lives
than choice A, but will also cost an additional $100 million more than choice A. If we
select B, then for every additional $1 million spent, we save one additional life. But
suppose that choice A were selected, except we added a health plan requirement that
would cost $1 million but would save 10 more lives. Under these conditions, selecting
choice A, with the additional plan, would spend $1 million for 10 lives, and plan B
would spend $1 million for one life. It would be economically better to select plan A
because we would save an additional 9 lives for each $1 million spent. See Karmel,
supra note 15, at 482 (utilizing a hypothetical problem to demonstrate how risk analy-
sis works in the area of brownfield remediation).
201. See Charles D. Bader, Brownfield Remediation, REMEDIATION MANAGEMENT,
May/June 1996, at 17 (noting that management and engineering controls are estab-
lished to lower the risks to human health and the environment as long as the in-
tended use is not changed or these controls interrupted).
202. See Robert A. Simons, Don't Just Clean Brownfields, ENGINEERING NEws-REC-
ORD, Nov. 23, 1998, at 139. From a real estate perspective, many contaminated sites
are not located in areas where the market can absorb these increased costs for site
preparation. "Research on 15 successful brownfields cases shows that site preparation
costs are about 10% higher than for equivalent greenfield sites .... " Id.
203. See id.
204. See Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra note 7, at S1.
205. See Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra note 7, at S1.
206. Russ Banham, Cooperation Helps Brownfields Bloom, J. OF COMMERCE, Feb.
13, 1996, at 6A (discussing how regulators are now realizing that one set of standards
should not apply to all clean-up situations).
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remediation of many contaminated sites.20 7 Such newer technolo-
gies include: bioremediation, in-situ vapor extraction, air sparging
and stabilization. 20 8 By allowing the use of these technologies on
a risk-based clean-up project, site management and remediation
activities have been accelerated. 20 9 Additionally, the ability of the
properties to move through the real estate market more swiftly
has spurred new interest in VCP programs. 210
Along with newer technology, institutional controls have been
put to use as part of risk-based clean-up programs. 211 Institu-
tional controls are "legal or physical restrictions on the use of, or
access to, a site or facility to eliminate or minimize potential expo-
sure to contaminants."21 2 Some simple examples of institutional
controls are fences, deed restrictions, in-place contamination
monitors, restrictions on who may access a site, and site-use re-
strictions. 21 3 Once these controls are in place, they cannot be
modified without first notifying the DEC, and they are most often
permanently attached to the properties through the deed even as
the site is repeatedly resold to different parties. 21 4 As many as
fifteen states currently include the use of institutional controls as
part of their VCPs, and their growing acceptance and use has
helped stir additional interest in the area of brownfield
remediation. 215
207. See Miller & Gladstone, supra note 50, at 4 (stating that the regulatory agen-
cies are now recognizing that there is a greater benefit to promoting the reclamation
of contaminated properties through the use of flexible programs as opposed to the
continued enforcement of the rigid uniform standards of the past).
208. See Miller & Gladstone, supra note 50, at 4. Bioremediation uses naturally-
occurring organisms to degrade organic contaminants. Air sparging is where air is
injected into contaminated groundwater to remove volatile organic chemicals through
volatilization or biodegradation. See id.
209. See Dean Jeffery Telego, A Growing Role: Environmental Risk Management in
1998, RISK MANAGEMENT, March 1998, at 19.
210. See id.
211. See Amy L. Edwards and Karis Lynn North, Institutional Controls Minimize
Risks at Restored Brownfields, LEGAL TIMES, June 16, 1997, at S40 (noting that in the
past institutional controls were used only as temporary measures during the remedia-
tion process until the clean-up was completed, but now they have become an integral
part of many corrective actions).
212. Id.
213. See id. "The most commonly used controls can be divided into eight catego-
ries: deed restrictions, use restrictions, access controls, compliance monitoring, notice,
registry act requirements, transfer act requirements, and restrictive zoning." Id.
214. See Eisen, supra note 36, at 949.
215. See Eisen, supra note 36, at 949. As of mid 1997, Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Texas all included institutional controls in their
VCPs. See id.
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As many as forty states have already passed voluntary clean-
up or brownfield legislation.216 In New York, in spite of the fact
that the VCP is not statutorily based, more than 120 voluntary
agreements and consent orders have been signed since the pro-
gram's inception. 217
B. The City of New Rochelle and the Weyman Avenue Project:
One of New York's First Sites to be Remediated Under
the State VCP
One of the first brownfield sites to receive approval under the
VCP was a twenty-four acre plot in New Rochelle, Westchester
County, called the Weyman Avenue Urban Renewal Area. The
site consisted of two parcels that had been contaminated from
years of industrial use. The first parcel was approximately eleven
acres which held eight separate privately owned industrial facili-
ties, each of which was environmentally deficient and in dilapi-
dated condition.218 The second parcel of approximately thirteen
acres had contained an animal shelter and a municipal incinera-
tor that had ceased operation in 1975.219 The incinerator had
been in operation for close to 50 years prior to its closure and the
ash it produced was deposited on both parcels. 220 The City of New
Rochelle (hereinafter "City") was the lead volunteer in this under-
taking, which eventually included two private developers. 221 The
City first set out to create an overall development plan that would
attract financially stable developers and make the process of
remediation economically worthwhile.222 As part of their develop-
ment plan, the City needed to conduct an environmental assess-
ment of the site. To do this, the City retained the services of an
environmental engineering consulting firm.
The engineer retained by the City concluded that the site con-
tained lead and other metals within the buried ash, semi-volatiles,
and pockets of hydrocarbons from leaking underground storage
216. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 3078 et seq.; N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 26C (1993);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22A, chap. 445 (1993); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 21E (1993).
217. See Gerrard, supra note 45, at 10445.
218. See Frederick J. Koelsch, Using Municipal Authority to Facilitate Brownfield
Redevelopment: New Rochelle Weyman Avenue Urban Renewal Project, 8 ENvTL. LAW
IN N.Y. 33 (Mar. 1997).
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See generally id.
222. See id. at 41.
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tanks.223 The assessment also revealed that the contamination
had not spread into the aquifer under the site which was helpful
in lowering the risks associated with developing the site. 224 With
this knowledge in hand, the City moved forward in its negotia-
tions with the DEC to formulate a consent order and closure
plan.225 As part of this plan, the City decided that the erection of
large retail facilities would be the type of revenue-producing, job-
creating businesses best suited for this site. 226 The City sought
proposals from qualified developers and eventually settled on
Home Depot and G&S Investors to bring financial stability to the
program and participate in the redevelopment of these two
sites. 227 Thus, on Parcel One a Home Depot would be built, and
Parcel Two would contain a Price Club.
With these two well known retail stores on board, the City
next set out to acquire the properties situated within Parcel
Number One. To do this, the City believed condemnation was nec-
essary because it would be too difficult for the private developers
to assemble the eight privately owned plots. 228 In urban areas
like New Rochelle, "condemnation can be a valuable tool for ad-
vancing brownfields redevelopment.., as it allows a municipality
to take control of large tracts of blighted, contaminated property
for transfer to a third party developer ... "229 As part of the con-
demnation process, the City was required to relocate the existing
businesses. 230
Like most environmental remediations, the exact costs associ-
ated with site preparation and eventual clean-up were unclear.
The City and the two developers agreed to a cost-sharing plan
whereby the developers paid for all of the cost beyond a predeter-
mined amount paid by the City, with the right to terminate the
agreement if the costs went beyond a designated threshold.231
The developers also agreed to property-transfer restrictions and to
operate the retail stores for a minimum number of years to guar-
223. See Koelsch, supra note 217, at 41.
224. See id. at 41 (detailing the initial characterization of the site during the nego-
tiations with the N.Y.S. DEC).
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 42.
229. Id. at 42-43.
230. See Koelsch, supra note 217, at 42-43.
231. See id. at 42.
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antee that the City would reclaim some of the debt it had incurred
as a result of the project. 232
Once the properties were acquired, the City conducted a Ge-
neric Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "GEIS") to
evaluate general planning, environmental issues and financial is-
sues.233 The City was then required under SEQRA to complete a
formal Environmental Impact Statement (hereinafter "EIS") for
each of the two parcels prior to the start of remediation. 234 The
lengthy amount of time required to produce these statements
often causes the developer to back out. The City was able to sig-
nificantly shorten this period because the individual environmen-
tal impact statements for each parcel only needed to cover those
specific items not covered in the original GEIS.235
Once the plan, the developers and the EIS were all in place, it
was time to complete the process of acquiring the DEC's approval
of the remediation plan. The success of the project has been
largely due to the DEC's flexibility in evaluating the remediation
proposal as a whole and not just the existence and type of con-
taminants at the site. 236 The "NY DEC recognized the redevelop-
ment of the site represented the best opportunity to remediate
long-standing environmental deficiencies and at the same time re-
turn the properties to beneficial, revenue-generating uses."237
The DEC determined that the City's proposed remedial plan
would prevent the conditions at the site from presenting a signifi-
cant threat to human health or the environment, and on June 17,
1994, the consent order was signed by the DEC and the plan was
approved. 238
The plan included the construction of a multi-layered low-per-
meability soil cap, much like what would be used at Irvington, and
it required long-term monitoring and maintenance with some pro-
visions for the safety of the workers who would be remediating the
site. 239 The soil cap would also be topped in some areas by an
asphalt layer in locations where there was to be a parking lot.
These measures were included to prevent infiltration of the con-
taminated layer and prohibit the eventual run-off of contaminated
232. See id.
233. See id. at 44.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See Koelsch, supra note 217, at 44.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 45.
239. See id.
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water into the nearby stream and drainage structures. 240 The
plan also required the installation of vents to prevent the build-up
of volatile gases within the contaminated layer. The monitoring
plan would provide for the checking of the vent gases, stormwater
runoff, and groundwater for any sign of contaminants. 241
Since the VCP does not provide any financial assistance to its
volunteers, the parties involved at Weyman Avenue had to come
up with the funds on their own.242 The City financed close to $27
million in bonds to pay for the project. 243 The City provided the
majority of the financing for the environmental remediation and
relied on recouping this investment via the commitments from the
two retail stores to operate at the Weyman Avenue location for a
specified minimum number of years.244 Since it opened in 1996,
the Home Depot has done approximately $2 million in sales per
week, with taxable sales estimated at $1.5 million per week.245
The Price Club is projected to generate the same tax revenue for
the City. With 2.5% of the taxable sales going to the City in the
form of sales tax,246 these two new stores will generate approxi-
mately $3.9 million in sales tax annually.247 Along with this sales
tax revenue, the City will also receive property taxes from both
parcels. In addition to the money generated for the City, each
store has created hundreds of new jobs and revitalized an area
once thought dead from environmental devastation. 248 "The suc-
cessful redevelopment of the Weyman Avenue brownfields proves
municipalities, public agencies and private developers can work
together to transform underutilized and contaminated sites into
viable, revenue producing properties."249
C. Staten Island's Paper Recycling Plant: An Example of a
VCP Project in New York City
The Weyman Avenue site is not the only site to undergo a
dramatic turnaround as a result of the VCP. Under the shadows
of the state's largest landfill at Fresh Kills, Staten Island, con-
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See Koelsch, supra note 217, at 45.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 42.
245. See id. at 45
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See generally Koelsch, supra note 217.
249. Id. at 40.
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struction of a new factory began March 1, 1997 to turn part of the
city's trash into recycled paper to be used in the manufacturing of
cardboard boxes. 250 "The $250 million factory, on 35 acres facing
the Arthur Kill, is one of the largest industrial investments in the
city in recent decades .... ,,251 The site was an old Consolidated
Edison plant that is considered lightly contaminated. 252 The site
is the first to be remediated under the VCP in New York City.253
The plan is to erect two plants that will produce cardboard boxes
using 100% recycled paper.254 The plants will account for almost
$750 million in industrial development, provide over 1,000 perma-
nent jobs, thousands of construction jobs, and will take approxi-
mately 150,000 tons of paper from the city trash each year to be
recycled for reuse in the construction of the cardboard boxes. 255
The location of the facilities provides for lower raw material trans-
portation costs since they are near highways, Newark Airport, and
the landfill's garbage barge docks. 256 One particularly unique as-
pect of this project is that the site's previous owners, Consolidated
Edison and Carbonic Industries, agreed to clean up the site under
the VCP prior to turning it over to the developer. 25 7 This project
will not only recycle paper, but it will also recycle a piece of com-
mercial property that might have been left to sit idle as a result of
the presence of contamination.
D. A Return to the Village of Irvington: the Role of the VCP in
Revitalizing the Waterfront Park
Finally, let us not forget about the portion of the Irvington
Waterfront Park project that was performed under the VCP. Like
the Weyman Avenue site, the site in Irvington was partially
owned by a private development company.258 This private devel-
oper entered into a VCP agreement with the DEC to perform a
site investigation on a portion of the property prior to the remedia-
tion that is presently being conducted under Title V. 259 At Irving-
250. See John Holusha, Commercial Property/Recycling; A New Factory and New
Jobs? For New York? Yes, N.Y. TIMES, (Sunday-late edition) July 1996, at 7.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See id.
256. See John Holusha, supra note 250, at 7.
257. See id.
258. See Record of Decision, supra note 123, at 1.
259. See id.
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ton, a site with both municipal and private ownership, the parties
involved took advantage of the programs offered to each by the
state to work toward the common goal of remediation and
redevelopment. 260
As has been shown by the examples of Irvington Park, Wey-
man Avenue, and Staten Island, with some creativity, financial
backing, and broad beneficial economic goals, a volunteer or a mu-
nicipality can find a great deal of success under both Title V and
the New York State VCP. Clearer and more predictable remedial
standards based upon the health risks of possible exposure
through the future use of the property can dramatically reduce the
expense of clean-ups and can, in fact, encourage brownfield
redevelopment. 261
The issue of brownfields, or "environmentally impaired prop-
erties," is not a new one; yet it is only recently that parties other
than environmentalists have sought newer and more attractive
ways to develop an interest in their rehabilitation. 262 This grow-
ing level of interest and change in attitudes can be attributed to:
(1) the collection of experience in dealing with brownfields issues
now that many are being remediated; (2) a better and clearer un-
derstanding of the costs associated with clean-ups; (3) the onset of
more definable objectives and measurable standards; and (4) a
changing of opinions on the use of risk-based standards in evalu-
ating clean-up objectives. 263 As more success stories unfold, like
Irvington Park and Weyman Avenue, the public and municipal
participation in these remediation initiatives will likely increase.
IV. New York State's Two Brownfields Initiatives Do Not
Solve All of the Problems
As positive as the above experiences sound, there are some
issues and questions that have been left unaddressed and unan-
swered by both the VCP and Title V. For instance, for the
remediation of a site to be profitable, it has to be sufficiently sized,
in an excellent location, and the contamination must be at a level
260. See id. at 7. (Detailing how the Village of Irvington and Scenic Hudson en-
tered into a Voluntary Cleanup Agreement with DEC which helped enable the village
to receive funding under Title V for site investigation.)
261. See Gwathmey & O'Brien, supra note 7, at S1.
262. See Daggett, supra note 23, at 33.
263. See James P. Rigano, Brownfields and Redevelopment Of Contaminated Prop-
erty, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1997, at 1.
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that can reasonably be remediated.264 Not every contaminated
site satisfies these criteria. In addition, even though these pro-
grams provide ample initiatives, redevelopment might not be
worth the risks that come with unknown, and often unquantifi-
able, clean-up costs. 265 While there are insurance policies avail-
able to absorb some of these financial risks, these policies usually
become more expensive as the level of risk grows.
Other critics believe that states, in their haste to make
brownfield programs available and user-friendly, have loosened
clean-up standards to the point that they jeopardize public health
and safety. 266 Since these initiatives are in their infancy, a collec-
tion of data detailing the long-term success or failure of encapsu-
lating hazardous materials on brownfields properties does not
exist.
Remediation projects also typically require well capitalized
developers with knowledge of available insurance, regulatory pro-
cedures and environmental remedies. 267 To demonstrate further,
decontamination and demolition often require asbestos abatement
and disposal of petroleum products and hazardous wastes. 268 Not
only does the removal of these wastes contribute to the cost of the
remediation, they also must be handled by approved waste and
asbestos contractors. 269
Skeptics have also pointed to one other significant aspect of
these programs that raises concern: dealing with any government
agency can entail delay, expense, and general aggravation.270
Furthermore, even "though a clean-up today may seem compre-
hensive by today's standards, how can assurances be given that
improvements in scientific understanding of fate and transport is-
sues for chemicals will not result in new knowledge which calls
264. See Jelena Matic, Suzanne Shelley and Cathy Cooper, Opportunity Beckons in
Brownfields, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING, Oct. 1997, at 41.
265. See id.
266. See Judith Evans, Cleaning Up the Nation's 'Brownfields; Critics Want Some
Assurances Industrial Sites Aren't Re-Polluted, THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 25, 1995
at E01.
267. See Brownfield Update, BUILDING DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Aug. 1998 at 20.
268. See Jerry Ackerman, Turning Brownfields into Green; Contaminated Sites,
WORLD WASTES, May 1998 at 28.
269. See generally id.
270. See Carey S. Rosemarin and Christina M. Riewer, Purchasing Brownfields,
THE NAT'L LAw JOURNAL, Sept. 2, 1996, at B7.
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into question the previously completed clean-up."271 In addition,
the point most often raised, it seems, is the effect that brownfields
initiatives have on the issue of environmental justice.
Despite improvements in environmental protection in recent
decades, millions of Americans continue to live, work, play, and go
to school in unhealthy environments.2 7 2 Dozens of studies have
shown that those who live closest to toxic sites, with the worst air
and water pollution, highest levels of lead and pesticide poisoning
and least environmental enforcement, are persons with low in-
come or minorities. 273 Environmental justice is defined by the
EPA as "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all peo-
ple regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with re-
spect to development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations and policies."274 With that in
mind, brownfields redevelopment and environmental justice con-
cerns will need to walk hand in hand when they settle upon the
clean-up standards to be implemented for inner-city contaminated
properties .275
Most of these inner-city contaminated sites seeking to be re-
claimed are located in low income and minority communities. 276
The continued abandonment of these sites perpetuates the envi-
ronmental health hazards that frequent these economically de-
pressed urban locales. 277 While the initial offer of job creation and
economic revitalization may spark the interest of a community,
the possibility that clean-up standards will be used that are lower
than their suburban, non-minority counterparts may be a reason
to forgo the opportunity. Programs that provide any clean-up flex-
ibility, such as the New York State VCP and Title V, are under the
continuous watch of environmentalists who are concerned that
271. Daggett, supra note 23, at 47 (listing numerous points of concern raised as
brownfields remediation programs continue their rapid growth throughout the
country).
272. See Luke W. Cole and Richard Moore, Attacks on EPA Unfair, USA TODAY,
July 20, 1998, at 14A.
273. See id.; see also Poindexter, supra note 42, at 8, n.23 ("In 1991, 36 million
people (14.7% of the total United States population) lived in poverty. 42% of the poor
people lived in America's 'center' cities.") (quoting BusWnESS WEEKLY, May 18, 1992, at
38).
274. Malcolm Pirnie Envtl. Engineers, Environmental Justice Presentation (in-
house workshop presentation) (text on file with author).
275. See THE BROWNFIELDS BOOK, supra note 12, at 65.
276. See Berger, supra note 58, at 73.
277. See Berger, supra note 58, at 73.
1999] 119
37
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
"flexibility in clean-up standards will lead to second-class clean-
ups, especially in low-income and minority communities." 278
The creation of jobs is not the only incentive that these com-
munities should consider. Minority residents should have some
input into the remediation proposal to ensure that significant
value will be added to the neighborhood and that there exists a
goal to enhance the community as a whole. 279 It is no surprise
that the brownfield programs focus their attention on urban areas.
Some critics argue that, by lowering the clean-up standards and
encouraging the return of industries that create environmental
contamination to these lower income urban centers, we will only
ensure that our nation's environmental illness will remain in the
city.28 0 Unfortunately, many of these low-income communities
feel the pressure of allowing environmentally unfriendly industry
to return versus no industry at all, rationalizing that the value
that additional jobs bring would outweigh the potential environ-
mental threat caused by the industry.281 To avoid having to make
such a choice, residents and advocates for these communities
should insist on clean-ups, and the return of the types of industry,
that afford their communities the same level of clean as their sub-
urban neighbors.
One author has suggested that environmental contamination
is one part of a cancer that is slowly killing our cities. 28 2 Brown-
field programs that leave some contamination in place as part of
the clean-up plan are only a "drug to alleviate the symptoms" 2 3 of
this cancer. At the same time, they effectively eliminate the possi-
bility for a cure. 28 4 Below the quiet, clean surface will lie a con-
taminated stratum seeking a catalyst to provide it the opportunity
to work its way back to the surface. The advocates for environ-
mental justice and brownfield remediation will have to work to-
gether if they want to find a cure for this "cancer" and succeed in
278. Gerrard, supra note 19, § NY.07
279. See Environmental Justice: Brownfields Initiative Grants Citizens New Oppor-
tunities to Voice Concerns, HAZARDOUS WASTE NEWS, June 9, 1997 (noting how, in the
past, minority residents of low-income communities had very little interaction with
developers).
280. See Poindexter, supra note 42, at 4.
281. See Environmental Justice Presentation, supra note 274, at 13.
282. See Environmental Justice Presentation, supra note 274, at 3.
283. See Environmental Justice Presentation, supra note 274, at 3.
284. See Environmental Justice Presentation, supra note 274, at 3.
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reclaiming contaminated properties while being environmentally
sound and economically fruitful.28 5
V. Conclusion
The latest trend in the environmental field is the redevelop-
ment of contaminated properties. 28 6 Developers have concluded
that many of these parcels are ripe for acquisition and remedia-
tion.2 7 This trend towards recycling industrial sites is a vital
component of long-term environmental protection because it pro-
motes the cleaning of contaminated property while simultane-
ously protecting our quickly vanishing pristine open lands. For
this trend to continue, the DEC and state legislators must con-
tinue to work on revising existing programs or creating new initia-
tives to address some of the shortfalls of Title V and the VCP.
Perhaps the state's commitment to indemnify municipalities
under Title V can be extended to the volunteers who participate in
the VCP. This certainly would encourage more contaminated-
property owners to come forth and return their parcels to produc-
tive, safe uses. Or maybe the use of risk-based clean-up stan-
dards, which has found success in the VCP, can be utilized more
often when formulating a Title V plan. Remedial strategies that
are driven by the end use of the site will open the doors to many
municipalities which do not want to go through the process of
cleaning a future industrial site as if it were going to be the loca-
tion of a pre-school.
Finally, the issues arising from the problem of addressing en-
vironmental justice concerns which have unfortunately always
been with us, will continue to plague the poor and minority com-
munities of our inner cities as long as there is industry. There are
some things these communities can do to minimize or lessen their
effects. They can insist on more rigid clean-up monitoring and su-
pervision on those sites that are not returned to pristine condition;
but more importantly, they must become a part of the planning
process to ensure that when a site is to be reclaimed, it truly
brings a benefit to their community as a whole.
Both the VCP and Title V are in their infancy, so it is too early
to judge their long-term success both in attracting participants
285. See THE BROWNFIELDS BOOK, supra note 12, at 70.
286. See Miller and Gladstone, supra note 54, at 4.
287. See James P. Rigano, Brownfields and Redevelopment of Contaminated Prop-
erty, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 14, 1997, at 1.
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and in returning environmental and economic benefits to the com-
munities where they are located. From the examples of Irvington
Park and Weyman Avenue, it is evident that utilizing both the
statutory and agency created initiatives can be rewarding to the
developer and community at large. As we cross into the new mil-
lennium, it will be the responsibility of today's legislators, engi-
neers, scientists, and business owners to see that the dream of our
35th President becomes a reality. John F. Kennedy, in his last
public address, given at Amherst College on October 26, 1963 said,
I look forward to an America which will not be afraid of
grace and beauty, which will protect the beauty of our natural
environment, which preserves the great old American houses
and squares and parks of our national past and which will build
handsome and balanced cities for our future.2ss
With programs such as Title V and the VCP, New York State
is on its way to preserving its precious open space and natural
habitat, but more can still be done. These programs need to be
strengthened to continue this trend towards preservation of our
environment and economic revitalization of our inner cities.
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